While it has often been perceived that Kemalist Turkey succeeded in firmly establishing secularization, the Islamist movement that followed the 1980 military intervention questioned
T he struggle between different kinds of Islamists on one side and the state founded on the principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on the other, have been a continuous factor in the shaping of Turkey's politics. The foundation of the Turkish Republic effectively pushed Islam out of the political and social arena, and marginalized Islamic actors that posed threats to Kemalist secularism. With the advent of the multiparty system in 1945 and the country's first free and fair multi-party elections in 1950, Islamist groups sided with the Democratic Party, led by Turkey's first democratically elected
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Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (Prime Minister from 1950 -1960 . Under his leadership, they opened the door for the resurgence of cultural and political Islam. 1 The policies of Menderes reinstated Arabic as the official language of prayer and supported the expansion of Imam Hatip schools (secondary schools for prayer and sermon leaders), agitating the secular establishment and leading to the first military coup d' état of 1960 and the execution of Menderes in 1961. 2 The 1960 coup d' état is only one example of the consequences of the attempts by civilian governments in Turkey to enforce policies that defer from the policies of Ataturk's secularism. Nevertheless, Islamic social and political activism continued to grow following the execution of Menderes. In the 1980s, politicians like Turgut Ozal (Prime Minister from 1983 -1989 President from 1989 President from -1993 attempted to soften the boundary between Islam and secularism. The state's increasing tolerance of Islam in the 1980s would lead to further military intervention to uphold the importance of the fundamental principles of Ataturk in the face of politicians like Necmettin Erbakan (Prime Minister from 1996 -1997 , who launched "grass-roots efforts to restore Islam's key role in Turkey. " 3 The three sections of this essay aim to explain: how the level of Islamic activism rose following the military intervention of 1980, due to state policies during the 1980s and 1990s; how consequences of the Islamic tolerance during 1980s and 1990s led to the rise and fall of the Islamic leaning Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983 of Erbakan; and, finally, how the Justice and Development Party (the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP) differed its policies from the Welfare Party in the 1990s to ensure political victory.
I. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis-Islamic Tolerance and the 1980 Coup d' état
In the 1970s, Turkey was polarized by intense ethnic, sectarian, and ideological conflicts that were in large measure fueled by a severe economic downturn caused by the 1973 oil crisis and the long-term consequences of massive rural-to-urban migrations that had been taking place since the 1950s. In an attempt to reduce social tension and focus on the main political danger, Evren's military forces sought to adopt the policy of "controlled Islam, " with the goal of forming a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis, " a policy which praised the Islamic interpretation of Sunnism in Turkey for guarding pious Turks from international Islamist movements. 8 In this section, I will explain how religion was used by the military as a source for an ideology of national unity. These decisions by the Turkish military and government functioned as stepping stones for the Islamists to strengthen their political power and for Islam to regain momentum as a key determinant of Turkish nationalism and politics.
The military forces dissolved parliament, then quickly moved in to purge anyone that was perceived as a "leftist, " members of the extreme right, and some of the more prominent Islamists. This included Erbakan, who was banned from running for office for seven years. Post-coup policy thereafter aimed to use and promote Islam as a tool against communism, a threat with which, in the words of Chris Morris, "the military regime which ruled Turkey in the early 4 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity, 68. 5 The economic crisis was due to a combination factors including: a persistent balance of payments deficit, an industry depended on foreign inputs, and the oil price shocks of the 1970s. increasingly allowed graduates to find positions in the government bureaucracy. 17 The military leadership's efforts to open Islam to the social, public, and political arenas had results contrary to their vision, in that Islam-focused politicians, like Ozal, Erbakan, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who eventually became the influential leader of the AKP, would come to play dominant roles in Turkish politics. In 1980, the opportunity to "invent a more religious Turkish polity" arrived, and it was with this that the military helped the Islamist to attract the votes of the discontented.
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The outcome of the 1983 parliamentary elections, which marked the return to a parliamentary democracy, albeit a carefully circumscribed one, sharply deviated from the victory that the Turkish military had expected. 19 The results of the election would lead to the rise of a leader who played a significant role in allowing Islam to regain momentum as a key determinant of Turkish nationalism and politics. The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) of Turgut Ozal, which was openly criticized by the military regime, won the election over the military supported Populist Party. 20 Ozal, who became the Prime Minister and later the President of the Republic, was a former Islamist with Kurdish roots who had openly declared himself to be a practicing Muslim. 21 Ozal was the first Turkish president to undertake the haj to Mecca, and he stood against some military decisions, as when he vetoed the appointment of a new chief of the general staff.
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The failure of the military leaders to perceive the Motherland Party as a threat led to the rise of Ozal and further strengthened the Islamists' position in Turkish politics. Although Ozal mostly acted within the framework set by the military, he was perceived as the man who officially legitimized the "radically new perspectives on the role of 
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Ozal's years in power nurtured the Islamic identity and strengthened Islamic values in the social and public sphere. In the 1983 elections, Ozal appealed to what he termed "the long repressed Muslim identity of Turks, " and followed up by claiming that, under his rule, the political leadership would be more sensitive to religious issues. 24 Ozal's party encouraged owners of small capital in the smaller cities and towns in Anatolia to invest their money in market-oriented businesses. 25 Ozal's notion of liberalism and free market capitalism within Muslim parameters allowed for the increasing tolerance of Islam, and "contributed to the expansion of the public sphere in multiple directions. " 26 Ozal's reforms were mainly to the benefit of entrepreneurs based in Anatolia who had been marginalized by the previous governments which tended to be closely allied with the elite of Turkey's secular business leaders like the Koc and Sabanci families. Ozal's economic policies were favourable towards and greatly supported by the Islamist forces that thrived under his leadership conditions. Ozal's government introduced Turkey to Islamic finance and banking according to sharia requirements and this led to a large influx of capital investments from oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia. 27 This oil money was then distributed to new Islamic groups via well-funded financial circles. Ozal's policies provided the legal foundations for charitable donations used for religious purposes.
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The increased interaction with other Islamic business communities and the restoration of historic connections by Islamic groups marked a change from pre-1980 Turkey. Ozal's anti-bureaucratic and free market policies were supported by the bourgeoisie of large Turkish cities, as well as the small-scale business owners who supported Islamic symbols and ethics as a weapon against state intervention in the economy and big industrialists who enjoyed state patronage. 36 This form of Islam, it was thought, would be closely monitored and tamed, and "subsequently the Islamist groups entered the system through the expansion of educational opportunities, economic activity, and party politics. " 37 Thus, by inviting the Islamist groups into the system, the secular state thought it could maintain its hold on the religious movements while using their religious notions to combat the Leftleaning Marxist groups.
During the 1990s, the Islamic challenge brought success for the Welfare Party in both national and municipal elections. 38 With the sudden death of Ozal in 1993, the Welfare Party was able to win over the traditional urban voters by promising them an end to corruption by imposing a "just order" rooted in Islamic traditions. 39 Voters supported the party's embrace of Islam because "it made it seem morally "purer" than the discredited parties of the center-left and center-right. " 40 Studies attribute the popularity of the Welfare Party to a rise in religiosity and religious values. 41 Under the military rule and later under the leadership of Ozal, first as Prime Minister then as President, religion was highly valued and religious schools were greatly expanded to drive home these values. Although the supporters of the Welfare Party were not necessarily Islamists in the political sense, they were moved by religious motives. 42 This explains the support for the Welfare Party in municipal elections by the rural voters that had migrated to the cities, since this group traditionally considered Islam "a core element of their identity. " 43 In the 1960s and 1970s, mass migrations to the cities occurred due to increased poverty in the countryside as a result of state policies that favoured the mechanization of agriculture. 44 However, the rural population failed to integrate into their new surroundings in the cities. The low-income newcomers needed low-cost housing which led to the development of squatter houses, known as gecekondu, often on state land. 45 Among these squatter towns, Islam "became a means of communication and alliance formation, " which Erbakan utilized to gain votes. The Welfare Party's supporting base grew in the poor neighbourhoods and squatter towns, and the Welfare Party used religious organizations and foundations to help the poor, gaining The policies of Erbakan's Welfare Party demonstrated the extreme form of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, by illustrating that political Islam was still limited and under the control of military leaders who valued Ataturkism. By the time Erbakan's party was winning municipal and national elections, there was a sharp division between secular and Islamist sociocultural lines; the Welfare Party became one of the main platforms for "political Islam to articulate its demands within the public sphere. " 47 Erbakan's victory set the stage for him to challenge the secular establishment through his Islamist policies, but his call for the establishment of an Islamic state caused extensive public fear and suspicion. 48 Erbakan's actions following his 1996 election victory included: hinting that he might pull Turkey out of NATO; forming a new, NATO-style alliance amongst Islamic nations; threatening to terminate Turkey's long-standing bid to join the European Union; and vowing to overturn the legislation forbidding women to wear the hijab while working in state buildings. 49 Erbakan's propositions directly challenged Ataturk's policy of aligning with the West, and his suggestion of attempting to legalize Islamic clothing in state buildings was a further blow to Ataturk's state policies of secularism, which promoted western modernity and clothing. Although Ozal also valued Islamic symbols and principles and expanded openings for Islam under the notion of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, unlike Erbakan, he embraced Western ideas, demonstrated through his support for the Americans against Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War in 1991. 50 It became clear that the Turkish military, as the supporters of the fundamental principles of Ataturk, were not going to go along with Erbakan's radical plans for an Islamic revival. On February 28, 1997, in what became known as the "February 28 Process, " the National Security Council (an advisory body composed of top military commanders, the Prime Minister, and several cabinet members) came to the conclusion that measures were necessary to curb the pro-Islamist activities of the Welfare Party. 51 The military presented Erbakan's government with a list of measures that were intended to curb his Islamist activities and Erbakan was left with no choice but to accept the military's measurements. 52 While Erbakan initially agreed to the imposed measures, he feared that restricting the Islamist media and closing private Koranic schools would alienate his party's grassroots support. 53 With increasing public pressures led by the military, which used public meetings to warn of the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, Erbakan resigned as prime minister on June 18, 1997; the Welfare Party was subsequently dissolved and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years.
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III. Successful Campaign by Dissociation: The Victory of the AKP
Following the fall of the Welfare Party, "alternative codes of conduct" were formulated between the state and the Islamic politicians. 55 The primary role of the Turkish military can be defined by looking at Article 35 of the Internal Service Act of 1961, which states that the role of the military is to "safeguard and defend Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the constitution. "
56 Since the Kemalist principles and doctrine are fully incorporated into the constitution, the Turkish military then sees itself as the protector of those principles and doctrines. 57 In the final section of this paper, I argue that, although the founders of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), registered in 2001, have their roots in the Welfare Party, they had to change their political actions in order to avoid the fate of Erbakan's party. The key founders of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Bulent Arinc, had all represented separate currents within Erbakan's wing. 58 In order to gain legitimacy and the approval of the state's elites, like the military leadership, these politicians had 51 Gulalp, "Political Islam in Turkey, " 39. 52 Gareth Jenkins, "Muslim Democrats in Turkey?, " Survival 45, (2003) The AKP leaders, unlike Erbakan's Welfare Party, appreciated Ozal's policies and aimed to shape their own policies to match his. The AKP's most prominent figure, Erdogan, came to identify himself with Ozal's policies as a way for society to reactivate Ozal's legacy, and utilized this association to promote his own policies. 60 Erdogan became the only leader to identify himself with the spirit of both Menderes in the 1950s and Ozal in the 1980s; by invoking Ozal's legacy, Erdogan was able to form a public policy that demonstrated the compatibility of overt religiosity with what the state considered tolerable. 61 Erdogan was able to redefine the Islamic identity of Turkey and to distinguish that identity from Erbakan's notion of Islamic identity. Prior to the formation of the AKP, Erdogan had publically stated "praise to god; we are all for sharia" and went further by saying "one cannot be secular and a Muslim at the same time. You will either be a Muslim or a secularist. " 62 The statements made by Erdogan illustrate his views as a former member of the Welfare Party, as they resemble Erbakan's radical Islamic views. Erdogan and the AKP founders recognized that a patient approach was needed to gradually build support for a greater political role for Islam within the structures of the Turkish Republic. 63 In order to achieve support and stability for Islamist politics, the AKP founders "thus decided to break with Erbakan's confrontational approach. " 64 The AKP founders were able to appeal to both Western supporters and Islamist supporters by avoiding the policies of Erbakan, which insisted upon Islam as the guideline for Turkish politics. The adoption of a pluralist aspect allowed the AKP leaders to appeal to a wide range of supporters. According to Yavuz, the AKP leaders were more exposed to European ideas, while also maintaining a sense of clearly defined Islamic identity.
65 Accordingly, their centre-right political party appealed to Islamists who were willing to work within the democratic system, as well as to the liberal democrats who wanted further social, political and economic freedoms. 66 This then explains why the AKP leaders based their politics on that of Ozal rather that of Erbakan, since Ozal's Motherland Party was able to integrate the business community, liberal democrats and the Islamists. 67 The pluralist approach was successful, as the supporters that were attracted to the AKP were drawn to factors other than the party's views on religion; this explains why two-thirds of the people who voted for the AKP in their first election had never voted for Islamist parties before. 68 One major difference between Erbakan's politics and those of Erdogan is that the AKP leadership had a desire to take Turkey into a stronger relationship with Europe. Immediately following their national electoral victory in 2002, the AKP leadership worked on the project of fulfilling the European Union criteria for beginning accession talks. 69 The AKP saw the EU criteria for democratization, human rights and state reform as "an echo of its own struggle against the army and the Islamists over the past 20 years. " 70 The normative base of the AKP consists of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which promotes a new global discourse of human rights and democracy, representing the Westernization of Islamism in Turkey. 71 When the accession talks began in 2005, the "AKP seemed legitimized as a proWestern political party pursuing Turkey's traditional foreign policy, " and EU support among "pro-Western liberal Turks" had increased significantly. 72 By blending a moderate Islamic identity with a proWestern mentality, the AKP aimed for social integration and stability. By avoiding radical Islamist policies, the AKP leaders have managed to gain the trust of segments of the Turkish military and the civilian population since they acknowledge that the government has to pursue a secular, and more specifically, a pro-Western political agenda. The AKP have promoted the image that, with the right balance between policies that are both Islamic and pro-Western, various segments of the Turkish population can utilize the secular political framework.
